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Summary
This briefing paper uses the example of a changing UK/Scottish government relationship after Brexit to demonstrate 
how to analyse the role of politics and policymaking in the transformation of energy systems.
Brexit will create a new division of policymaking responsibilities between EU, UK, and devolved governments.
In this paper we divide energy policy competences according to levels of government. Initially, it suggests that we can 
generate a clear picture of multi-level policymaking. However, the formal allocation of competences only tells a partial 
story, because actual powers may operate differently from the strict legal picture. These blurry boundaries between 
responsibilities may be further complicated by Brexit, even if it looks like the removal of a layer of government will 
simplify matters. 
Instead of imagining clear lines of accountability, think of energy policy as part of a complex policymaking system – 
in which the link between powers, practices, and outcomes is unclear – and an energy system, in which government is 
only one of many influences on outcomes. 
Key findings
• Brexit could have a major impact on UK energy policymaking, but its likely effect remains unclear.
•  We can predict major changes to formal policymaking responsibilities. There is less certainty of the policies that may 
arise from EU, UK, and devolved governments.
• The law is only one aspect of policy, and policy is only one influence on energy system outcomes.
• ‘Systems thinking’ helps inform discussions of, for example, the impact of Brexit on the transition to a low carbon 
energy system. 
• However, terms such as ‘energy systems’ will only be useful when researchers and practitioners clarify their meaning 
and identify the role of policy in their transition. 
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Constitutional change could have a major effect on UK 
energy policy. Brexit will produce a new division of 
policymaking responsibilities between EU, UK, and 
devolved governments. It will affect the ways in which 
governments seek to influence aspects of energy demand 
and supply. Yet, there is high uncertainty about how these 
changes will affect the ‘energy system’: 
• The impact of key events and choices is still unclear, 
prompting much short term governmental, private 
sector, and consumer hesitancy. Actors know that key 
aspects of multi-level policymaking will change, but do 
not know how it will affect policy. 
• It is not always clear what an ‘energy system’ is, how it 
influences policy and policymaking, and how any shift 
in responsibilities will affect the system. 
• Analysts contribute to uncertainty by describing these 
developments in very different ways. Some focus on the 
profound importance of politics to policymaking 
instability and policy change. Others use ‘whole systems 
thinking’ to identify the connectedness of technology, 
supply chains, and commercial and individual demand 
without incorporating politics or showing how policy 
change contributes to system change. 
Therefore, to address uncertainty about the impact of 
Brexit on energy policy and outcomes, we need to identify 
the immediate impact of political change and situate its 
effects within a wider analysis of energy systems. 
This briefing paper uses the example of a changing UK/
Scottish government relationship after Brexit to illustrate 
how to analyse the role of politics and policymaking in the 
transformation of energy systems.
We draw on published work (Cairney et al, 2019) to describe 
developments in the formal division of policymaking 
responsibilities which combine with informal processes. 
UK and Scottish governments rely increasingly on a 
shared powers model, which blurs boundaries between 
responsibilities, and produces the need for 
intergovernmental relations to ensure policy coherence. 
We also draw on an ongoing review of the ‘energy systems’ 
literature (Munro and Cairney, 2019) to clarify what people 
mean when they describe (a) an energy system and (b) how 
a government can influence it. 
UK and Scottish governments engage with ‘systems 
thinking’ to a certain degree by encouraging a transition 
from high to low carbon systems. However, they do not 
clarify the extent to which they can influence the aims 
they describe, or if they rely on cooperation between 
many actors in public and private sectors. Similarly, most 
academic studies do not define an energy system well 
enough to show how government policy fits in.  
Our review helps identify three different stories of  
energy system transitions.
Overall, we show that the immediate impacts of Brexit on 
formal policymaking responsibilities are relatively clear 
compared to the ways in which governments use their 
responsibilities to produce policy in action. The impact of 
political and policymaking change on the proposed 
transition towards energy system sustainability is least 
clear, but we can at least provide a way for governments 
and academics to describe this process clearly.
Formal and informal 
divisions of energy policy 
responsibilities
In Table 1 we divide energy policy competences according 
to levels of government. Initially, it suggests that we can 
generate a clear picture of multi-level policymaking. 
For example, the EU focuses on: environmental law and 
state aid regulations in relation to trade and competition, 
energy security, and objectives such as to reduce energy 
demand and increase the proportion of energy supply from 
renewable sources. The UK is responsible for energy 
security overall, covering key aspects such as the 
production and regulation of nuclear energy, the regulation 
of electricity supply, and access to the minerals (coal, oil, 
gas) required to produce energy. The devolved role seems 
limited to the delivery of EU regulations and UK-driven 
policies, the promotion of measures influencing supply and 
demand, and non-energy policies with an indirect impact 
on energy use (Cairney et al, 2019: 460). 
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Table 1: Distribution of energy decision-making competences.
Level Direct competences Indirect competences
European 
Union
Internal energy market (gas and electricity)
Energy security
Promotion of renewable energy
Regulation of biofuels 
Promotion of energy efficiency/energy efficiency 
standards
Energy networks
Trade in and safety of nuclear materials 
(Euratom)
State aid regulation
Competition law
Free movement law
Greenhouse gas emissions trading
Other atmospheric emissions
Water quality
Environmental impact assessment
Offshore carbon storage
Trans-European networks
Innovation/R&D funding
Structural funding & strategic funding  
(e.g. in transport and energy infrastructure)
EU Agencies Cross-border market integration and network 
harmonisation (ACER)
United 
Kingdom/
Great 
Britain
Ownership of resources (coal, gas, oil, gas 
storage rights vested in the Crown)
Regulation of energy markets
Licensing of energy producers, suppliers and 
network operators
Energy security 
Energy taxation
Renewable energy subsidies/grants
Energy efficiency subsidies/grants
Nuclear energy Golden Shares
Nuclear licensing and nuclear safety
Competition law
Financial services regulation
Intellectual property and commercial law
Climate change laws
Social security (winter fuel payments;  
energy debt payments)
Workplace health and safety
Emergency powers
Treaty-making powers
R&D funding
UK/GB 
Agencies
Gas and electricity market regulation (Ofgem)
Coal mining licensing (Coal Authority)
Oil and Gas Authority
Office for Nuclear Regulation
Nuclear Decommissioning Authority
Competition law (Competition and Markets Authority)
Financial services regulation (Financial Conduct 
Authority)
Health and safety (Health and Safety Executive)
Devolved Promotion of renewable energy
Promotion of energy efficiency
Fuel poverty support systems
Electricity and gas installations consents
Onshore oil and gas licensing
Nuclear waste storage
Crown estate (seabed use/storage rights)
Marine licensing and planning
Property law (access to land/subsoil; nuisance; 
servitudes and wayleaves)
Environmental emissions & water quality
Climate change law
Environmental impact assessment
Housing law/building regulations
Economic development
Social security law
Transport policies (including Air Passenger Duty  
from 2016)
Devolved 
Agencies
Environmental emissions and water quality (SEPA)
Seabed leasing (Crown Estate Scotland)
Local Land-use planning
Source: Cairney et al (2019: 460). We acknowledge (but do not include in the table) the wider international arena, which affect competences directly 
(e.g. nuclear energy; energy investment treaties), and indirectly (e.g. international environmental law; international law of the sea; international trade law).
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However, the formal allocation of competences only tells 
a partial story. Cairney et al (2009: 460-3) identify reasons 
why actual powers may operate differently from the strict 
legal picture:
• EU, UK, and Scottish competencies are not exclusive. 
It is often possible for another government to engage 
in a field when the formally responsible government 
is inactive.
• Some EU powers are designed to promote action, 
rather than strict prescriptions backed by effective 
regulation. 
• Some responsibilities are devolved and Europeanised, 
which gives the UK a role in coordinating the Scottish 
government contribution to the UK’s EU obligations.
• There is a general lack of clarity about overlaps in 
responsibility. For example, the UK has overall 
responsibility for energy, but the Scottish Government 
oversees planning permission for electricity generation, 
power lines, and onshore drilling applications. Further, 
both UK and Scottish governments control aspects of 
transport responsibilities which affect energy demand.
• Some powers are increasingly shared in complicated 
ways, in practice and by design. Any field not reserved 
by Scotland Acts is assumed to be devolved, including 
aspects of climate change policy not in the Scotland Act 
1998. In areas like ‘fracking’, there is an explicit UK 
decision to retain control for taxation but devolve 
licensing and planning. 
• Some UK powers are devolved to Scottish ministers. 
‘Executive devolution’ describes Scottish ministers 
having the power to take forward UK government 
policies. 
• Incomplete powers and political vetoes. Some EU 
powers are difficult to disentangle, such as when its 
energy competence does not preclude the UK from 
extracting energy resources but its environmental 
policies contribute to the UK shift from highly polluting 
coal-fired power generation. The same may be true for 
UK powers in Scotland, although UK ministers have – 
for example – tended to accept a Scottish Government 
‘veto’ over new nuclear power.
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• Legal powers and political reality go hand in hand. 
The UK has often exceeded its formal influence by 
forming effective networks across the EU to liberalise 
energy markets. The Scottish Government has carved 
out a disproportionate role in renewable energy partly 
because it helps the UK meet its EU obligations.
• The law is one of many contributors to multi-level 
energy policy. Energy policy consists of a large number 
of interacting ‘instruments’ or ‘tools’ – including 
regulation, persuasion, policies to distribute services or 
redistribute income, and the money and staffing behind 
the implementation of key aims – with an intended or 
unintended, direct or indirect effect. In multi-level 
policymaking systems, there is high potential for policy 
incoherence (when many instruments undermine or 
contradict each other). There are mechanisms for 
intergovernmental relations to encourage information 
sharing, learning, and dispute resolution, but in a 
context where it is difficult to make sense of the overall 
impact of policy (partly because governments do not 
control that impact). 
Cairney et al (2019: 465) discuss examples in which these 
blurry boundaries play out in practice, and may be further 
complicated by Brexit, including: the lack of coordination 
around multiple ways to address energy demand (including 
energy labelling and product/building standards, emissions 
reduction measures, promotion of efficient generation, and 
buildings performance measures); and, the future 
harmonisation of rules to encourage an EU-wide energy 
market. Further, energy issues seem most stark when we 
consider the cross-cutting nature of energy ‘transitions’, 
in which governments at all levels are committed – albeit 
in different ways, with different roles to play – to the 
transformation from high to low carbon energy systems. 
The impact of 
government policy 
on energy system 
transitions
The idea of an energy system transition or transformation 
magnifies post-Brexit confusion because it raises three 
major forms of uncertainty: 
1. Conceptual. What people mean when they describe 
an energy system, and how they imagine its 
transformation.
2. Policymaking. How they describe the contribution of 
policymaking and policy to system change.
3. Political. How they debate and compare the best ways 
to seek energy system transformation. 
Munro and Cairney’s systematic review (in review, 2019) 
shows that academic studies and UK and Scottish 
governments refer to energy systems, and their hopes for 
energy transitions, but with a tendency to use these terms 
frequently but not precisely. They identify only 24 (of 1115) 
articles that provide a clear definition of ‘energy system’ in 
relation to an established literature on systems or systemic 
transitions. They also show that governmental discussions 
of transitions are often aspirational and metaphorical, with 
insufficient attention to how they actually contribute to 
system change.
The UK Government has made several commitments in 
relation to climate change and reducing greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions that require significant shifts in the UK’s 
energy system. The Climate Change Act 2008 presented a 
legally binding target of GHG emission-reduction levels of 
34% by 2020 and 80% by 2050, followed by an amended ‘net 
zero’ target (100% reduction) in 2019 (1990 baseline levels). 
Some of the UK’s delivery plans refer to the concept of an 
energy system, but our review suggests that the role of 
‘systems thinking’ is not set out systematically in key 
policy documents (particularly when compared to more 
tangible discussions of, for example, specific commitments 
on future energy mixes). 
The Scottish Government’s (2017) energy strategy provides 
more explicit reference to systems thinking and the ‘whole 
system view’, and its approach is lauded by participants in 
the energy sector (who we interviewed as part of our wider 
research project). It identifies functional requirements of a 
system such as ‘resilience’ and describes ‘the connections 
between the energy system and all parts of the economy’, 
to seek: 
• ‘a well-balanced system capable of providing secure and 
affordable energy to meet Scotland’s needs’
• ‘an assessment of technological changes and advances 
with a bearing on Scotland’s energy system’
• ‘System security and flexibility – Scotland should have 
the capacity, the connections, the flexibility and 
resilience necessary to maintain secure and reliable 
supplies of energy to all of our homes and businesses as 
our energy transition takes place’.
• ‘The equivalent of 50% of the energy for Scotland’s heat, 
transport and electricity consumption to be supplied 
from renewable sources’ and ‘An increase by 30% in the 
productivity of energy use across the Scottish economy’ 
(pp 6-8). 
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However, it does not define an energy system, and the 
document’s images rely on very loose metaphors rather 
than more-established conceptions of systems in the 
energy literature. It describes many different things as 
systems – including: ‘integrated local energy systems’, 
‘smarter domestic energy applications and systems’ and 
‘heat, transport and electricity systems’ – and describes 
a distinctive Scottish energy system as ‘part of the wider 
Great Britain and European energy market’ and subject to 
‘disruptions in the international energy system’ (pp 6-12). 
Overall, the language of systems projects a very general 
way of thinking holistically about energy policy, including 
to zoom out and analyse the interconnectedness of 
processes such as: 
• the relationship between heat, transport, electricity, 
and energy efficiency; 
• industrial assets, and economic opportunities relating 
to technological development; 
• hopes for a long term transformation towards 
decarbonisation and sustainable energy supply and 
demand (in the historical context of North Sea Oil as the 
provider of disproportionate economic activity). 
Such accounts are potentially useful, since governments 
could describe a pragmatic and legitimate role to 
encourage a well-functioning rather than a centrally 
controlled system. Yet, without any attempt to define a 
system, its key components and processes, and the specific 
role of government in helping to secure specific targets, 
these discussions remain vague metaphors with potential 
to mislead rather than inform. 
Resolving conceptual 
and policymaking 
uncertainty
Munro and Cairney (2019) identify, from the peer reviewed 
academic literature, three main ways in which to identify 
what an energy system is, what its transformation looks 
like, and how policymaking contributes to system change. 
It turns systems thinking into three different stories that 
provide take home messages for actors seeking to influence 
their transition:
1. Socio-technical systems. High carbon energy regimes 
are highly path dependant, but innovation within an 
initially insulated niche – supported by a wider social 
and political environment – can aid ‘socio-technical 
transitions’ (STT) or ‘sustainability transitions’ to a low 
carbon system.
2. Complex systems. Governments may propose a 
transition from high to low carbon energy systems, 
but policy outcomes are not in their control and there 
is too much uncertainty to predict the effect of their 
actions. Many accounts emphasise the need for central 
governments to give more discretion to local actors to 
adapt to a rapidly changing environment.
3. Social-ecological systems. We need effective 
institutions to manage finite resources and minimise 
environmental damage. Key institutions are not – and 
need not necessarily be – controlled by governments or 
single central governments. Rather, we need rules and 
mechanisms to ensure high cooperation among many 
actors and societal ownership of the means to achieve 
energy transitions.
Resolving political 
uncertainty
This conceptual clarity should help academics and 
policymakers produce more coherent analysis to inform 
political debate about what type of transition is 
appropriate (and if or how governments can secure it). 
Key issues include the measure of progress we prioritise, 
such as the most efficient or equitable way to transform 
energy systems. For example, the Scottish Government Just 
Transition Commission (JTC, of which Professor Turner is a 
member) focuses on ‘fairness’ and improved opportunities 
and wellbeing for all Scottish citizens while achieving 
commitments on climate neutrality set out in the Climate 
Change (Emissions Reduction Targets) (Scotland) Bill. 
Wider issues involve the role that the state, market, and 
citizens should play in that transformation. For example, 
Chilvers et al (2017: 440) – as part of the Transition 
Pathways Consortium – describes three potential pathways:
1. The market is the main pathway and form of 
governance. In this scenario, the main technologies are 
coal and gas (combined with carbon capture), nuclear, 
and offshore wind; government management is 
minimal, focusing on strategy and carbon prices; and, 
heating/transport demand for electricity is ‘much 
greater than today’.
2. There is major central government coordination. 
The main technologies remain the same, the 
government commissions low carbon electricity from 
big businesses, but more energy efficiency means 
demand is ‘slightly higher than today’.
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3. There is major civil society direction. The main 
technologies are solar, onshore and offshore wind, 
renewable heat/power sources; there is more 
community ownership and service user engagement to 
produce local solutions, and a combination of efficiency 
improvements and consumer awareness produces 
demand ‘lower than today’.
Conclusion
Any attempt to understand the impact of Brexit on the 
UK and devolved energy system needs to address a 
combination of political, policymaking and conceptual 
uncertainty. Initial policymaking uncertainty relates to the 
likely impact of constitutional change on the division of 
multi-level responsibilities. Although it is possible to 
compare current responsibilities and possible futures, 
the actual production of policy relates to overlapping and 
shared powers combined with a tendency of policymakers 
to go beyond their powers (or accept that other 
governments will do so). This uncertainty about how 
governments will seek to make energy policy contributes 
to wider uncertainty about their impact on energy systems. 
‘Systems thinking’ is crucial to academic (and often 
governmental) analysis, but it is not yet clear how current 
discussions of constitutional and policymaking changes 
relate to the language of systems. 
In theory, we can combine conceptual insights to tell 
an overall story of energy system transitions. First, for 
example, niche innovation supported by a wider social and 
political environment can help produce the transition to a 
low carbon system. Second, governments may be able to 
help facilitate this transition, but policy outcomes are not 
in their control (even if they are ultimately held 
responsible). They need to share responsibility for 
outcomes with other actors more able to adapt to a rapidly 
changing environment. Third, much of this responsibility 
will lie with non-governmental actors who need to find 
ways (and incentives) to cooperate to manage resources 
and reduce environmental damage. 
A significant energy transition is already underway in 
the UK, but its future remains uncertain. To make further 
progress, we need to develop rules inside and outside 
government to produce (a) the mechanisms to ensure 
high cooperation among many actors, and (b) societal 
ownership of the means to achieve energy transitions. 
If so, we can clarify the role of policy and policymaking in 
a post-Brexit energy transition and continue to debate 
the most appropriate means to do so. 
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